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INTRODUCTION
An acute observer of American political culture, Alexis de Tocqueville
once stated, "[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond.
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which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."' Though he made
this statement in 1840, Tocqueville might as well have been speaking of
America today. Indeed, legal scholar Robert Kagan calls this American
penchant for settling disputes through the legal process "adversarial
legalism. ' '2 While legalistic forms of conflict resolution are, as de
Tocqueville notes, an integral part of American democracy, Kagan asserts
that adversarial legalism has become an increasingly prominent part of
political and policy conflict in the United States over the course of the last
thirty years.3
Nowhere has the growth of this peculiar culture of legalism been more
evident than in the transformation of Social Security disability policy in the
past two decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, the federal courts were
frequent and aggressive participants in Social Security disability policy
making, and they were instrumental in driving the growth of disability
benefit programs at a time when there was not a consensus in favor of
Social Security expansion in either Congress or the White House. More
importantly, however, not only did the courts expand the disability
programs; they also changed the composition of the Social Security rolls
and opened the door to a quandary of political and administrative troubles
in an effort to make the disability certification process more "accurate." In
the past, the strict administrative regulations governing the certification of
disability excluded the vast majority of adults with mental disorders and
disabled children. Throughout the mid-1980s and early 1990s, advocates
for the mentally disabled and disabled children contested those regulations
in court. They succeeded in convincing federal judges to strike down a
host of these regulations and force the Social Security Administration
(SSA) to revise its standards for childhood and mental disability.
Most studies of growth in disability programs tend to focus on
economic factors. Nevertheless, while the ups and downs of the business
cycle undoubtedly influence expenditures for disability programs, they

1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (George Lawrence trans.,
Harper Perennial 1969) (1835-40).
2. See generally Robert A. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism andAmerican Government,
10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 369-406 (1991); Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial
Legalism andAmerican Government, in THE NEW POLmCS OF PUBLIC POLICY 88-118 (Marc
K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds, 1995) [hereinafter Kagan, AdversarialLegalism, 1995];
Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad, AdversarialLegalism: An InternationalPerspective, in
COMPARATIVE DISADVAWAGES? 146-202 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997).
3. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism, 1995, supra note 2, at 92-93.
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leave a significant portion of the growth unexplained.4 In order to
understand that which economics cannot explain, we must turn to politics,
the political struggle over the proper legal and administrative definition of
disability. Legalism, therefore, provides a useful framework for an
analysis of both the transformation of disability programs and the
corresponding challenges that have arisen in Social Security disability
policy in recent years because of those changes.
A full account of the judicial influence on Social Security disability
programs would require a book-length, perhaps even encyclopedia-length,
treatise and would take us far afield from our present concern. This article
focuses narrowly on the activities of Legal Services attorneys, mental
health reformers, and children's advocates. Although mental health
reformer groups are only one of many antipoverty organizations involved
in advocacy efforts on behalf of the disabled poor, they have been among
the most persistent, the most active, and the most successful in using a
litigation strategy to achieve their larger policy goals. According to one
Social Security official, though there were "pockets of spokespersons for
other disabilities," no other disability group presented, as concerted an
effort as did mental health reformers. As this article argues, their success
and the corresponding transformation in Social Security disability raises a
number of policy and administrative challenges that Congress has yet to
address.
I. THE GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY

The two disability programs of Social Security, Disability Insurance
(DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), have changed dramatically
in the past two decades. Together the two programs function as an income
floor for the disabled.6 DI provides cash payments to disabled workers
who have paid into the disability trust fund through the payroll tax. The
amount of the benefit depends on the amount of the past wage contribution.
SSI supplements the income of disabled workers whose contributions are

4. See David C. Stapleton et al., Empirical Analysis of DI and SSI Application and
Award

Growth,

in GRowTH IN DISABILITY

BENEFITS: EXPLANATIONS

AND POLICY

31-92 (Kalman Rupp & David C. Stapleton eds. 1998).
5. Telephone Interview with Patricia Owens, Associate Commissioner, Office of
Disability, Social Security Administration (Apr. 25, 2000).
6. SSI also aids the aged, but expansion in that portion of the program has been
negligible.
IMPLICATIONS
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so minimal that their incomes fall below the poverty line. The SSI program
also provides up to $500 per month in income support to poor disabled
individuals who fail to qualify for DI because they have no history of
workforce attachment.
Both DI and SSI have experienced rapid expansion since the mid1980s. At its peak in 1994, the number of disabled persons receiving DI,
SSI, or both, reached 7.2 million, an increase of 70% since 1985.' In 1985,
approximately 92,000 workers received disability payments; by 1998, that
number had more than quadrupled to almost 450,000.8 Though a smaller
program than DI, SSI presented an even more pronounced pattern of
growth. Between 1985 and 1998, the number of disabled adults receiving
SSI payments nearly doubled from 1.9 million to 3.6 million, while
similarly, the number of disabled children rose fourfold from a mere
227,000 in 1985 to a high of 1 million recipients by 1996. 9 Throughout the
1990s, DI experienced an average growth of seven percentage points each
year. Meanwhile, between 1990 and 1996 SSI's disability rates averaged
6.5% annually for adults and 20.7% annually for children between 1990
and 1996.10 Enrollment and application for SSI has dropped off sharply
since 1996. This is no doubt a result of the changes Congress made to the
program as part of its welfare reform initiative.
Even more significant than the number of disabled persons enrolled in
SSI and DI is the type of disabilities that beneficiaries present. Since the
1980s, the proportion of Social Security beneficiaries drawing payments
because of a mental disorder as opposed to a physical impairment, has
more than doubled. This transformation is especially stark in SSI
beneficiaries. In 1981, allowances based on a mental disorder comprised
10% of all DI awards; after 1986, between 20% and 25% of all allowances
were made because of a mental disorder. In 1981, only one out of every

7.

U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO/T-HEHS-95-97,

FEDERAL DISABILrrY PROGRAMS

FACE MAJOR ISSUES 3 (1995).
8. SSA, 5.D OASDIDisabled Workers, ANN. STAT. SUPPLEMENT 191 tbl.5.D1 (2001),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/Supplement/2OO1/5d.pdf (last visited March 2,
2002) [hereinafter SSA, Disabled].
9. SSA, SSI Annual StatisticalReport 1998, SSI ANN. STAT. tbl.2 (1999). The figure
of one million children enrolled in SSI is reported in SSA, 5SI Recipients with Federal
Benefits in Current-PaymentStatus as of December, 1998 SSI ANN. REP. tbl.IV.B4 (1998),
availableat http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/SSIR/SS198/ssilV.html (May 29, 1998) [hereinafter
SSA, Recipients].
10. Author's calculations based on data in 2001 SSA, Disabled,supra note 8 and SSA,
Recipients, supra note 9.
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ten persons receiving DI payments was mentally disabled;"
in the 1990s,
2
that figure hovered between one in four and one in five.'
Because SSI does not require applicants to demonstrate a history of
paid employment in order to qualify for benefits (thus allowing more
individuals with congenital or early-onset disabilities on the rolls), the
number of individuals with mental disorders has been more pronounced in
SSI than in DI. The SSA estimated that in 1977, roughly 18% of SSI
applicants who were awarded benefits suffered from a psychiatric disorder,
while another 13% were mentally retarded.' 3 By 1986, the mentally ill
comprised almost one quarter of those on the SSI disability rolls, and
within ten years that proportion grew to one in three.' 4 Today, mental
retardation and psychiatric disorders together constitute well over half the
awards made in SSI, but that figure is even higher in the case of children.
Almost two-thirds of children receiving
SSI are disabled due to either
15
mental illness or mental retardation.
The prevalence of the mentally disabled individuals among Social
Security recipients has had profound political implications. Mental
disorders are not only difficult to diagnose; in addition, measuring and
predicting their effect on the functional capacity of an individual is fraught
with uncertainty. This uncertainty can open the door to public perceptions
that the disability programs are filled with malingerers, frauds, and welfare
cheats. Moreover, because beneficiaries with mental disorders tend to be
younger than their physically disabled counterparts, their presence on the
rolls drives up program expenditures, now and in the foreseeable future.
Many policy makers also worry that giving a younger individual cash
benefits for life will encourage dependency and ruin that individual's

11. Mental disability refers to a disability resulting from any form of a mental disorder:
mental retardation, learning disabilities, psychiatric illnesses, addiction, and so forth.
Mental retardation refers strictly to clinically diagnosed retardation (in SSI and DI, I.Q.
below seventy).
12. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO/HEHS-94-34, SOCIAL SECURITY: DISABILrTY ROLLS
KEEP GROWING, WHILE EXPLANATIONS REMAMN ELUSivE 40 tbl.IV.6 (1994).
13. SENATE SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEWS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 164-65 (1983).

14. Sharon R. Hunt, Drug Addiction and Alcoholism as Qualifying Impairments for
Social Security Disability Benefits: The History, Controversies, and Congressional
Response 48 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with
author).
15. Author's calculations based on SSA, SSI ANN. STAT. REP., 2000 tbl.29 (2001),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssi_annuaLstat/2000/table29.htmi.
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chances for rehabilitation. Cash disability benefits for disabled children
raise especially thorny issues since the money is spent, not by the child, but
by the parent, thus creating a situation in which parents might have an
incentive to keep their children functionally incapacitated and helpless. As
long as the number of mentally disabled persons and disabled children on
the Social Security disability rolls remained relatively small, the SSA
largely swept these politically contentious questions under the proverbial
rug. By the early 1990s, however, the agency and the programs it
administered were beset by a host of administrative problems that, when
coupled with rapid program growth, created a firestorm of political
controversy. The court-driven expansion of Social Security disability
made these issues all but impossible for legislators and policy makers to
ignore.
II. LITIGATION AND POLICY CHANGE
Many scholars have examined the role of litigation in stimulating
policy change. Some, looking back at the Warren Court's crusading
liberalism, contend that the courts are only one of the many players in
political drama-and frequently, a constrained one at that. For instance,
using civil rights and abortion cases to illustrate his point, Gerald
Rosenberg argues that the federal courts are limited in their ability to
induce progressive policy change. Not only must judges base their
decisions on constitutional rights and court precedent that tend to constrain
governmental activism, but even if they are sympathetic to the objectives of
liberal reformers, judges must avoid drawing the ire of elected lawmakers
and the pubic. Indeed, in the face of intractable opposition, judges can do
little to implement and enforce their own decisions without the cooperation
of other political officials.' 6 A number of scholars, on the other hand,
argue that because of their insulation from popular pressures, courts can
and do generate policy change when other branches of government are
gridlocked. Through their rulings, judges can take bold, often unpopular
stands that educate the public and policy makers about the justness of a
litigant's claims, compel political debate on a topic that elected officials
would rather dodge, and set the wheels in motion for further policy

16.

GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABouT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 21 (1991).
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innovation. 17 Even if courts cannot directly make policy, they can at least
serve as a catalyst for larger progressive policy transforms down the road.
Of course, a number of scholars who acknowledge the judiciary's
influence on policy, nevertheless remain skeptical about whether the
judicial forum is necessarily a desirable place for policy making.
According to Robert Kagan and his colleagues, resolving policy conflicts
through litigation is expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful. Using the
dredging of Oakland Harbor as one example, Kagan contends the litigants
were caught in a war of attrition for many years as each side (the city of
Oakland, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of
Engineers, fishermen, and environmentalists) tried to exhaust the others
through endless rounds of environmental impact statements, legal motions,
and courtroom maneuvers. While attorneys grew wealthy, pressing public
needs remained unmet. The harbor remained undredged; jobs were lost;
and cargo ships went elsewhere.' 8 Similarly, both Donald Horowitz and R.
Shep Melnick argue that because judges base their rulings on only the cases
that come before them--cases that may or may not be representative of a
wider policy problem--and because they issue their rulings on a case-bycase basis, courts are not necessarily the best place to weigh the costs and
benefits of various policy alternatives.' 9 Indeed, insofar as courts exist to
enforce rights, the issue of costs-social or economic-is often obscured.20
Moreover, because judges are unable to follow through on their original
decisions--monitoring their implementation and modifying the remedy in
light of changing circumstances or unforeseen snafus-court intervention
can lead to 21unanticipated headaches for lawmakers and program
administrators.
Whether the courts had a significant effect on policy change is a
question of whether we see the glass as half full or half empty. Rosenberg
can hardly argue that Brown v. Board of Education22 and Roe v. Wade23 did

17. Id. at 21-26.
18. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism, 1995, supra note 2, at 98-102.
19. See DONALD L. HoRowTZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 255 (1977); R. SHEP
MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES];

CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

R.

108-111 (1994) [hereinafter

SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE

13-18 (1983).

20. Thomas F. Burke, On the Rights Track: The Americans with Disabilities Act, in
COMPARATIvE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997).
21. MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 19, at 108-10.
22. 348 U.S. 886 (1954).

283-85
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not matter, but proponents of litigation can not assert that these cases were
all that mattered. When political and social forces are moving in the same
direction as the courts, the courts are obviously, in turn, more effective as
purveyors of policy change. Nevertheless, as in the example of Social
Security disability, the courts can have an enormous impact on programs
even if the White House opposes such change and Congress is mired in
disagreement. Indeed, one seemingly small court decision can have
ramifications throughout the policy process, making certain outcomes more
likely than others. Cumulatively, these court decisions can push policy in
directions that would seem unthinkable in the absence of judicial
intervention.
Sullivan v. Zebley, 24 for example, single-handedly
transformed the SSI children's program. In the case of mental disability,
mental health reformers note that two court cases, Mental Health Ass 'n of
Minnesota v. Schweiker25 and City of New York v. Heckler,26 while not
necessarily changing the disability programs overnight, certainly
contributed to their success in convincing members of Congress and the
SSA to change the medical standards for evaluating mental disorders.
To be sure, the influence that the federal courts would come to have on
Social Security disability policy was not unforeseen. During the 1980s and
early 1990s, however, the relationship between the courts and the SSA took
a new and fateful turn, as the courts became a catalyst for forcing policy
change in the disability programs. Liberal advocates for the poor turned to
the court to block policy changes with which they disagreed and, in turn, to
induce expansive policy changes that they preferred. In the hands of these
advocates, courts were not just there to right individual wrongs, but also to
produce policies that they believed adhered more closely to the spirit of the
Social Security Act.
The court cases brought by advocates on behalf of disabled claimants
were a new force in Social Security policymaking. Previously, liberal
advocates had pushed expansive measures in Congress, working closely
with both the lawmakers who sat on the congressional authorizing
committees and executives at the SSA. The disability advocates of the
1980s and early 1990s, however, brought lawsuits precisely because they
believed that the channels that liberals had traditionally used were no
longer available. Because members of Congress and the SSA would not

23.
24.
25.
26.

410U.S.959(1973).
493 U.S. 521 (1990).
554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982).
578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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listen, advocates advanced their policy arguments in the courts. Victories
in the judicial venue provided advocates with the leverage needed to force
the SSA to the negotiation table in order to revise its mental and childhood
disability standards.
Whether we regard the courts' forays into policymaking as beneficial
or detrimental depends, in large part, on whether we like the end result.
Liberals, no doubt, heartily cheer the role that the federal courts have
played in loosening disability standards, while conservatives would cite
this as yet another example of judicial activism run amok. As the
following case of Social Security disability illustrates, however, reality is
often more complex. Ironically, the policy and administrative changes that
resulted from the litigation made the disability process more exacting and
thorough.
Program administrators now collected more thorough
documentation of impairments and paid greater heed to the needs of hardto-serve populations, such as the mentally ill and children. At the same
time, however, judicial intervention contributed to the administrative
problems that continue to plague the SSA. Judicial activism furthered the
fragmentation of Social Security disability policy and divorced policy
change from congressional input. Thus, at the same time that the SSA's
workload increased and its tasks grew more complex, congressional
budget-cutters were scaling back on the resources available to the agencythe result: long processing times, different standards of eligibility used in
different regions and at different levels of administration, and unpredictable
trends in enrollment and expenditures. Although Congress enacted a
number of reforms in SSI and scaled back the ability of legal services
attorneys to bring far-reaching class action litigation of the kind that drove
the expansion of SSI and DI in the 1980s and early 1990s, many of these
expansions remain intact as do a number of the problems they created.
Thus, while litigation brought many improvements to disability benefits
policy, not the least of which was the refinement of a disability
determination process rife with shortcomings and inaccuracies, at the same
time, it also begot a number of unforeseen administrative and policy
conundrums that continue to vex policy makers.
III.
MENTAL
DISABILITY
AND
CHILDHOOD
POLICYMAKING THROUGH LITIGATION

DISABILITY:

The judicial transformation of Social Security disability has many
roots. According to Kagan, adversarial legalism is endemic to the
American political system, evolving out of the nation's fragmented
institutional structure and its cultural mistrust of governmental authority.
The prevalence of adversarial legalism, however, increased in the 1960s
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and 1970s, when demands for increased governmental activism in
consumer protection, the environment, and civil rights were channeled
through the lawsuit. Rather than establish another bureaucratic agency to
enforce new regulatory laws, both liberals and conservatives agreed to
allow citizens to enforce those legal requirements independently through
court actions.27
The "rights revolution" came to Social Security in the 1980s; indeed, it
sprang from the collapse of the consensus that had supported system
expansion since the 1950s. Even in the absence of the legal advocacy
campaign waged by mental health reformers and children's representatives,
the federal courts were heavily involved in Social Security disability
programs for two reasons. First, determinations regarding disability are
inherently subjective and difficult to make, leaving a great deal of room for
disagreement between well-intentioned individuals. Though the statute and
regulations provide general guidance on the definition of disability,
disputes arise when the general definition is applied to specific cases.
Disputes also arise over whether the standards employed by the SSA are
correct in the first place; whether, in other words, the regulations that the
SSA issues are in accord with the dictates of the Social Security Act.
Second, the disability certification process reflects this difficulty by
creating a multi-layer process replete with opportunities to second-guess
previous determinations throughout the process, up through and including
the federal courts. 28 Thus, even before the Reagan administration's
disability reviews mobilized legal advocates, the courts were regularly
involved in disability policy because they are part of the appeals process to
which claimants were entitled. As the final forum for appeal for disabled
Social Security claimants, the federal courts articulate standards of
disability and procedural protections that they expect to be binding.

27. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, 1995, supra note 2, at 104-16. On the "rights
revolution," see R. Shep Melnick, The Courts, Congress, and Programmatic Rights, in
REMAKING AMERICAN POLMCS 188, 188-212 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis eds.,
1989).

28. Disability claims pass first through the state level where a state disability
determination agency makes the initial decision regarding eligibility. If the claimant
disagrees with the state agency, she can ask for a reconsideration of her claim. Following
reconsideration, the claimant can then appeal the denial through a complex administrative

appeals process that proceeds from the state agency to a quasi-independent hearing officeran administrative law judge-then to the SSA Appeals Council and finally to the federal
judiciary starting at the district court level.
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Nevertheless, three developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s
brought the "rights revolution" home to Social Security. First, by the mid1970s, with the maturity of the social insurance programs and dismal
economic and demographic forecasts, lawmakers turned from system
expansion to concern over issues of cost control. Once the Social Security
system entered an age of retrenchment, the judiciary became an attractive
forum for progressive policy change. Mental health groups and those
representing the poor had never ranked among the powerful in Congress,
but the rise in concerns over cost control further narrowed legislative
avenues of expansion. The Carter administration had addressed issues of
cost control through the 1980 disability amendments, which contained
provisions that reduced the size of benefits for younger disabled workers,
and mandated a periodic review of the disability rolls to weed out cheaters
and malingerers. When Reagan entered office, he stepped up the timetable
and scope of these periodic reviews. Throughout the early 1980s, the
Reagan administration downplayed the complaints of advocates and was
determined to pursue the reviews, while Congress remained paralyzed by
disagreement over how to handle the public backlash.
Unlike Congress, the federal judiciary was neither frozen by discord
nor constrained by cost considerations. While Congress and the executive
branch attempted to balance program spending with revenues, 2 9 judges
were much more amenable to the arguments of advocates, which focused
on individual rights and ignored the issue of overall costs. Moreover, since
Congress seemed incapable, at least until 1984, of rendering a legislative
remedy for the controversy over the periodic reviews, the judiciary's ability
to unilaterally grant relief to denied beneficiaries made them an especially
attractive forum for advocates representing aggrieved claimants. Of
course, as some advocates admitted, a courtroom was not the ideal setting
for pressing policy initiatives because judges lack enforcement and
implementation powers. 30 But given their inability to access the executive
branch and the impasse among lawmakers, advocates had little choice but
to turn to the courts.

29. MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 48-52 (1979).

30. See Leonard S. Rubenstein & Jane Bloom Yohalem, The Courts and Psychiatric
Disability, in PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: CLINICAL, LEGAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DIMEN SIONS 437-49 (Arthur T. Meyerson & Theodora Fine eds., 1987) (discussing the

problems advocates faced when using a litigation strategy to force progressive policy
change on behalf of the mentally ill).
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A second development brought the crusading litigation of the "rights
revolution" to the doorstep of the SSA: the backlash among liberal
advocacy groups against President Reagan's attempt to roll back "big
government." Antipoverty advocates' litigation strategy grew out of the
battle over the Reagan administration's disability reviews from 1981
through 1984. These reviews mobilized advocates, and, once mobilized,
those advocates were determined not only to halt the reviews but also to
expand the disability programs to previously excluded or underserved
groups. Between 1984 and 1992, advocates for the poor used litigation to
liberalize the disability criteria for the mentally ill, drug addicts and
alcoholics, and disabled children.
Finally, the SSA's own initial reaction to the first disability lawsuits
(which resulted not from the Reagan disability reviews but from an earlier
review of SSI), intensified the advocacy crusade in the courts. During the
disability reviews, the SSA asserted its long-standing policy of nonacquiescence. This policy infuriated and radicalized the lower federal
courts. According to its non-acquiescence policy, the SSA refused to
follow court precedent with which it disagreed, even in the circuit that
established the precedent, thus violating the accepted legal tradition of
stare decisis. While it would apply precedent from the Supreme Court, the
SSA ignored decisions handed down by lower courts, except in the case of
the specific litigant before the court. The agency argued that following
precedent would result in eligibility standards that differed between
circuits, thus contradicting Congress' intention to create nationally uniform
disability programs. 3 '
Non-acquiescence was a direct challenge to judicial authority that
enraged many judges. While the SSA could pursue this strategy when the
number of appealed cases and the attention surrounding them was minimal,
the periodic reviews brought thousands of cases before federal judges,
making the SSA's flouting of judicial authority obvious. As the Reagan
administration's reviews wore on and the SSA hardened its nonacquiescence approach, the lower federal courts became increasingly
hostile toward the agency. This hostility affected the way the courts treated
the SSA as soon as administrators entered the courtroom. According to R.
Shep Melnick, "Oj]udges' images of the administrative process are of the

31. On the SSA's use of non-acquiescence, see generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard
L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrativeAgencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 694-99
(1989); Miriam R. Rubin & Karen Ann Naughton, Government Nonacquiescence Case in
Point;Social Security Litigation, 15 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 768 (1987).
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utmost importance because the central issue in administrative law is the
extent to which judges should defer to administrative judgment and
expertise. Judges are unlikely to defer to administrators they do not
trust." 32 Surveying the situation, one legal advocate pointed out, "[a]ll of
this judicial frustration with the agency inure[s] to the benefit of
claimants. 33 After the reviews were over, the courts remained antagonistic
toward the SSA, much more willing to second-guess administrative actions
and suggest legal remedies than they had been previously.
As the reviews proceeded, advocates for the poor became more
knowledgeable about the legal arguments to which judges would respond.
They also grew more attentive to implementation and more forceful in
using the courts to follow through on compliance once they had secured a
favorable court decision. For instance, they skillfully used class action
suits to circumvent the SSA's policy of non-acquiescence. According to
one attorney familiar with disability claims, "the way to ensure agency
compliance with the law of the circuit is to make all decisions legally
enforceable by all claimants similarly situated" 34 through the "vehicle" of
the class action lawsuit. If the SSA would abide by an appellate court's
ruling only in the case of the specific litigant, then the solution, advocates
surmised, was to broaden the number of named litigants. 35 Throughout the
1980s, the class action lawsuit became a powerful tool for the liberalization
of disability standards. Although the large number of cases brought by
individual plaintiffs is not insignificant, this paper will focus primarily on
class action suits.
This article discusses the transformation of Social Security disability in
the areas of mental disability and childhood disability, but the findings
apply to other areas of disability as well. Legalism began in 1981 with the
disability reviews, and continued throughout the next fifteen years. By
1990, almost every aspect of disability was under dispute in the nation's
federal courts.

32. R. Shep Melnick, AdministrativeLaw and BureaucraticReality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.

245, 246 (1992).
33. See CAROLYN A. KUBITSCHEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY: LAW AND PROCEDURE
INFEDERAL COURT 9 (1994) (For additional quotations demonstrating the vitriol between the
judiciary and the SSA, see id. at n.34).
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id..
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IV. REMAKING DISABILITY

In order to understand the effect of this litigation advocacy campaign
on the disability programs, one must understand how the SSA determines
disability. The steps that the SSA uses to determine whether a person is
disabled under the Social Security Act are highly technical and very
complicated. They also seem bureaucratically mundane. They are,
however, of vital importance to the politics of Social Security disability.
Subtle shifts in any one of these steps can produce vast aggregate changes
in the number and type of claims approved for benefits.
According to the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she is
unable to "engage in substantial gainful activity', 36 because of a "medically
demonstrable," 3 long-term "physical or mental impairment. 38 When
certifying a claimant, the SSA considers three components of the disability:
1) the medical impairment (the severity of its clinical signs and symptoms);
2) the functional impact (the extent to which the impairment prevents an
individual from performing certain activities; and 3) the vocational
characteristics of an individual (the extent to which her age, education, and
work history will prevent her from finding a job). 39 A person is deemed
"disabled" if a medical impairment is so severe that the person, given her
functional and vocational profile, is unable to engage in remunerative
work. 4°
Generally, the SSA deems the medical manifestations of impairment
the most concrete and least subjective of the three factors. Clinical
descriptions of medical signs and symptoms are catalogued in the agency's
Listings of Medical Impairments.4 1 On the other hand, functional capacity
and vocational profile are more subjective because they are difficult to
measure and because their manifestation and severity can vary widely
between individuals who are otherwise similarly situated.42 Nonetheless,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1) (2002).
42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. 404.1521; 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 (2002).
42 U.S.C. § 223 (d)(2); 20 C.F.R. 404.1521; 20 C.F.R § 416.921.

41. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A (2002).
42. See Carroll M. Brodsky, Factors Influencing Work-Related Disability, in
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY:

CLINICAL,

LEGAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSIONs

49-65

(Arthur T. Meyerson & Theodora Fine eds., 1987); Saad Z. Nagi, The Concept and
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social functional capacity and work history tend to be the most significant
predictors of whether a person will actually work in the future.43 The
tension between these two goals-the desire to ground disability on
something objective (like clinical observations of medical phenomena), on
the one hand, and, on the other, the desire to produce an accurate judgment
as to whether a particular claimant can work (taking into account functional
capacity and vocational characteristics)-has long been a source of
consternation within the Social Security Administration. Although policy
makers operated on the assumption that Social Security's definition of
disability should weigh the biological, functional, and vocational aspects of
disability, the political standing of DI and SSI rests on the understanding
that the more objective factors-the clinical criteria for qualification-will
dominate the disability certification decision. 44
Over time, however, the courts encouraged the SSA to adopt an
interpretation of disability that was increasingly individualistic, one that
incorporated greater attention to the unique circumstances of the particular
claimant with greater weight placed on aspects of disability that the SSA
believed to be easier for the claimant to feign or influence. Judges, for
instance, required the SSA to place greater weight on functional capacity;
the testimony of friends, family, and acquaintances; opinions of the
physician treating the claimant (whom the SSA fears will be tempted to
side with her patient); and the claimant's own statements regarding pain
and discomfort. Nevertheless, to be fair, many current officials at the SSA
argue that as a result the SSA adopted a framework of disability
determination that was much more accurate in terms of predicting whether
an applicant could actually work.45 In a rather ironic twist, the disability
determination process had to become more individualistic and subjective in
order to achieve greater accuracy because disability itself is an individual
and subjective phenomena.

Measurement of Disability, in DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 1-15
(Edward D. Berkowitz ed., 1979).
43. William A. Anthony & Mary A. Jansen, Predictingthe Vocational Capacity of the
Chronically Mentally Ill: Research and Policy Implications, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 537,
541 (1984).
44. DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 83-84 (1984).
45. Interview with Janet Bendann, Official, Office of Childhood Disability, Social
Security Administration, Baltimore, Md. (Mar. 7, 2001).
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V. MENTAL DISABILITY

When, in March of 1981, the Reagan administration attempted to purge
the disability rolls of beneficiaries the SSA found to be "no longer
disabled," mental health reformers believed that the SSA had adopted an
unrealistically strict interpretation of disability. They mobilized to enforce
what they believed was the proper interpretation of the statutory standard of
disability, but they eventually accomplished much more. Ultimately, they
convinced the SSA to completely rewrite its mental disability standards
and, in the process, succeeded in establishing an entirely new way of
classifying mental disorders. The SSA's review of the Social Security
disability rolls had a devastating impact on mentally ill beneficiaries.
Though they comprised only 11% of DI beneficiaries and 18% of SSI
recipients, persons with mental illness constituted 26% of the
terminations.46 Mental Health Association of Minnesota v. Schweiker 7 was
the first of the lawsuits brought by mental health reformers, followed
shortly by another class action lawsuit, City of New York v. Heckler.48
As reports of the large numbers of mentally disabled beneficiaries who
had been cut from the rolls poured into their offices, attorneys for the
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law scoured the records of terminated
individuals for patterns that could serve as the basis for a legal challenge.
Under its evaluation practices at the time, the SSA presumed that, with the
exception of persons over the age of fifty, all claimants alleging mental
disability whose clinical signs and symptoms were not as severe as the
medical standards contained in its Listings of Medical Impairments were
capable of performing at least unskilled work. The practical effect was to
discount the test of functional and vocational factors in the case of younger
claimants and to reduce the disability determination to a simple question of
whether the claimant demonstrated the medical findings catalogued in the
Listings. The effect was to make eligibility all but impossible for younger
claimants, many of whom had qualified under the much looser
interpretation of mental disability in place in the early 1970s, before the
retrenchment ethos of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Mental health
reformers decided to contest the SSA's process for weighing evidence,

46. Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled: Hearing Before the Special
Committee on Aging, 98th Cong. 164-65 (1983).
47. 554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982).

48. 578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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arguing that the evaluation violated the Social Security Act because it did
not pay enough attention to functional and vocational capacity. It seemed a
subtle shift in emphasis, but it had a profound effect on how loosely the
standard of disability was applied in the case of the mentally ill.49
The Bazelon Center and Legal Services filed suit challenging the
psychiatric evaluation practices in Minnesota and New York State.
Attorneys argued that this practice failed to provide the individualized
assessment mandated by the authorizing statute. To bolster their case, they
enlisted the aid of mental health professionals who were troubled by the
reviews, and who testified that the SSA's disability criteria were not
sufficient to judge the true work capacity of a mentally ill individual. The
mental health advocates were successful in both suits. In 1982, the
Minnesota District Court overturned the SSA's psychiatric rating policy,50
calling it "arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and an abuse of discretion."
Judge Jack Weinstein, the judge in the New York case, was even more
stinging in his rebuke of the SSA. He characterized the evaluation process
for mentally disabled claimants as a "paper charade," and castigated the
SSA for relying on "bureaucratic instructions rather than individual
assessments." 5 ' In both cases, the courts found that the SSA had used an
improper standard when adjudicating the claims of mentally ill individuals
and had therefore wrongfully terminated or denied benefits to thousands of
individuals. Both courts enjoined further use of the SSA's psychiatric
evaluation standards and ordered the agency to reverse all denials to class
members and re-adjudicate claims under a court-imposed standard of
disability.
At the same time that the Bazelon Center pushed class action
challenges to the SSA's evaluation of mental disability, legal services
agencies focused on the procedural protections afforded to claimants with
mental disabilities-or more precisely, the lack thereof. In the early 1980s,
the SSA maintained a strict policy of termination for non-cooperation. If a
beneficiary whose file was pulled for review or a claimant who had applied

for benefits failed to comply with the agency's requests for additional
information, the SSA reserved the right to terminate or deny benefit

49. Leonard S. Rubenstein et al., Protectingthe Entitlements of the Mentally Disabled:
The SSDI/SSI Legal Battles of the 1980s, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 269, 271 (1988);
Leonard S. Rubenstein, Science, Law, and Psychiatric Disability, 9 PSYCHOSOCLAL
REHABILITATION J. 1, 7-21 (1985).
50. Mental Health Ass'n of Minn., 554 F. Supp. at 166.
51. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. at 1124.
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payments. Legal advocates argued that the non-cooperation policy was
unfair to individuals with mental illness because it did not take into account
the unique vulnerabilities of the mentally ill, thus violating their due
process rights. Individuals with mental illness, advocates contended,
frequently did not answer the SSA's mailed notices for information
because their disorders made them too confused or paranoid to respond.
Their silence, however, should not mean they were being uncooperative.
A New York District Court agreed. In Schisler v. Heckler, the court
52
held that the SSA's non-cooperation policy was unfair to the mentally ill.
In keeping with its emphasis on individualized justice, the court asserted
that due process required that "procedures be tailored ...to the capacities

and circumstances of those who are to be heard, to insure that they are
given a meaningful opportunity to present their case."53 The SSA,
however, had not altered its notification procedures "to the capacities and
circumstances of mentally impaired individuals."' The court ruled that the
SSA could not withhold payments on grounds of non-cooperation if an
individual's failure to cooperate could be attributed to her mental disorder
unless the agency followed certain procedural safeguards.
These
safeguards included visits to the claimant at home and efforts to contact
family members and acquaintances to obtain the information needed. 55 On
similar grounds, several other courts ordered the SSA to re-open and reinvestigate the files of thousands of mentally disabled individuals who had
failed to appeal their terminations and denials.56 Although the procedural
changes seem small, these decisions made it extremely difficult for the
SSA to continue its review of mentally disabled benefit applicants because
they made benefit termination administratively cumbersome.57
Through the Mental Health Association of Minnesota, City of New

York, and Schisler cases, as well as other similar class action suits, the
federal courts pushed the SSA toward the adoption of a more
individualized and comprehensive disability certification process, one that

52. Schisler v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
53. Id. at 1549-50 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 423 U.S. 319, 349 (1976)).
54. Id. at 1550.

55. Id.
56. Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256, 257 (3d Cir. 1983); Brittingham v. Schweiker,
558 F. Supp. 60, 60-62 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Kapp v. Schweiker, 556 F. Supp. 16, 23 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
57. Many of these procedural protections were later codified in the Social Security Act
in the 1983 amendments and in the SSA's regulations.
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placed greater emphasis on the particular circumstances of the claimant: his
actual functional capacity, his work history, and his particular ability to
navigate the bureaucratic process of disability application. Standardized
processes and rules, like the non-cooperation policy and the use of the
Listings, had to take into account the specific circumstances of each
mentally disabled claimant.
However, mental health reformers were not satisfied with simply
tinkering with the rules of disability certification. They wanted to change
the rules themselves so that the individualized emphasis that the courts
demanded was codified in the statute and regulations. In this regard, the
litigation battle in the courts played to their advantage in Congress. By
1984, public backlash against the reviews, the sheer number of lawsuits,
and open warfare between the courts and the SSA over the nonacquiescence policy compelled Congress to act. In the fall of 1983, the
SSA confronted 95 pending class action lawsuits challenging some aspect
of disability determination. 5 8 Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Margaret Heckler, announced a moratorium on further reviews, and later
that year, Congress enacted the 1984 Disability Benefits Reform Act,
legislation that built upon the complaints that advocates had voiced through
their litigation. The law gave advocates much of what they wanted,
including a provision requiring that the SSA rewrite its medical Listings for
mental disorders with input from advocacy representatives.5 9 A one-two
punch of litigation plus legislation, the revision of the Listings of mental
disorders further loosened the standards of mental disability, thus hastening
the enrollment of large numbers of individuals with mental retardation and
mental illness. After the publication of the revised adult Listings of mental
disorders in 1985, much of the litigation diminished, but did not disappear
entirely. Instead, the courts continued to remain active in disability issues.
The judicial liberalization of mental disability after 1984 took many forms,
and was accomplished through both class action and individual lawsuits.
Although the number of class action suits declined, individual suits took on
added importance once the SSA gave up non-acquiescence in 1988.
In some cases, judges loosely interpreted the types of information
claimants were required to present in order to justify a claim. For example,
the SSA has long maintained that a claimant alleging a disability due to

58. KuBrrscHEK, supra note 33, at 37- 38.
59. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-1039, pt. 5, at 31 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3080.
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pain must provide evidence of a medical condition or source that might
serve as the cause of that pain. In 1988, however, a district court ruled that
psychosomatic pain, pain that an individual with a mental disorder believes
he feels, could be debilitating enough to justify a claim, even if no
objective evidence for the pain existed. 6° "[I]f in a person's mind, he
suffers pain," the court held, "then he truly suffers whether the cause and
justification are there.'
Another court ruled that occupational stress,
which the SSA defined as the "demands of work, '6 2 was not characteristics
of the job, but rather, the claimant's subjective reactions to the job. Thus,
though vocational experts might not consider a particular job too stressful
for a claimant with a mental disorder, if the claimant believed otherwise, he
might not possess the functional capacity to cope with workplace
demands.6 3 Other courts held that the mere diagnosis of a severe mental
illness along with the subjective testimony of the claimant, was sufficient
to justify an award. 64 This, however, flew in the face of the SSA's
assertion that what counted was not the diagnosis of a disorder itself, but
the limitations that that disorder placed on the claimant's ability to function
and earn a living through gainful employment, a determination that, the
SSA argued, it alone had the prerogative to make.
In other mental disability cases, federal judges increased the burden of
proof that the SSA had to satisfy in order to deny or terminate payments.
For instance, courts held that if a claimant stated that he was mentally ill,
the SSA had to treat those statements as evidence of a mental disorder and
weigh it in its adjudication.6 5 On the other hand, if a claimant denied that
he suffered from a mental illness and refused to seek treatment, those
denials could not be taken at face value since mentally ill claimants "may
be unable to recognize the need to seek treatment." 66
Another important line of mental disability court cases developed in the
area of alcoholism and drug addiction, where again the courts loosened the
disability standard. Before Congress eliminated substance abuse as a

60. Boiling v. Bowen, 682 F. Supp. 864, 867 (W.D. Va. 1988).
61. Id. at 867.
62. Lancellotta v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 806 F.2d 284, 285 (1st Cir. 1986).

63. Id.
64. Luna v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (D. Colo. 1986).
65. Miller v. Bowen, 703 F. Supp. 885, 888-89 (D. Kan. 1988).
66. Caldwell v. Sullivan, 736 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (D. Kan. 1990); see also DeLeon v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1984).

2002]

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY

qualifying impairment for Social Security disability benefits in 1996,67 the
SSA classified these disorders as mental disorders. Similar to other mental
disorder Listings, the substance addiction standards were revised in 1985,
but this set of Listings differed dramatically from the Listings for other
mental disorders. Claimants could not qualify for disability benefits based
on their addiction alone; instead, they had to satisfy the medical standards
for one of nine referenced impairments. 68 A claimant could also be found
to be disabled by his addiction if he showed "end-organ" damage, that is,
damage to the eyes, heart, brain, or kidneys. 69
Several district and appellate courts, however, refused to adopt the
SSA's characterization. They ruled instead that chronic addiction was a
medical impairment, and therefore, could serve as an independent source of
disability regardless of whether the claimant satisfied the medical criteria
contained in the Listings. 70 According to these decisions, addiction alone
was disabling if it was uncontrollable and it prevented the claimant from
engaging in gainful employment. The claimant did not have to prove "endorgan" damage or any other physiological or anatomical abnormality.
Other courts, while not explicitly contradicting SSA rulings, narrowed
or expanded the evidence that the SSA could weigh when determining
whether an addicted claimant could work in a manner that tipped the
balance of adjudication to his or her benefit. For instance, according to the

67. The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110
Stat 847 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 422 (1996)).

68. Those impairments included: organic mental disorders, depressive disorders,
anxiety disorders, personality disorders, peripheral neuropathies, liver damage, gastritis,
pancreatitis, or seizures.
69. Employees' Benefits, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.09 (2001).
70. Thompson v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1992); Arroyo v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 82, 87-88 (1st Cir. 1991); Lubinski v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d
214, 217 (8th Cir. 1991); Shelltrack v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1991); Nelson
v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1988); Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121-22
(3d Cir. 1987); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1987); LeMaster v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 839, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1986); Purter v. Heckler, 771
F.2d 682, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1985); Ferguson v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1985);
Metcalf v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1985); Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d
243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1981); DeCarolis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 724 F. Supp.
71, 74 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Johnson v. Sullivan, 749 F. Supp. 664, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Cooper v. Bowen, 707 F. Supp. 260, 262 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Koszewski v. Bowen, 700 F.
Supp. 10, 11 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Hall v. Bowen, 669 F. Supp. 976, 978 (N. D. Cal. 1987);
Brown v. Bowen, 672 F. Supp. 1268, 1271-72 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Murphy v. Heckler, 613 F.
Supp. 1233, 1234 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Migneualt v. Heckler, 632 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D.R.I.
1985); Burton v. Heckler, 622 F. Supp. 1140, 1145-46 (D. Utah 1985).
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Seventh Circuit, ability to engage in normal daily activities is not indicative
of an addicted individual's ability to work because the conditions of work
"are not identical to home life."' The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand,
ruled that the SSA must consider the detrimental effect of a claimant's
alcohol related arrests on his desirability as a job candidate.72 Thus, while
the SSA could not look at daily activities, it had to consider arrest records
when determining an individual's work capacity. Similarly, other courts
held that failure to complete a treatment program could be proof of chronic
and disabling addiction, 3 but bouts of sobriety and past success in a
treatment program could not be treated as indicative of an individual's
ability to control his alcohol intake. 74 In the hands of some courts,
therefore, evidence that could help a claimant qualify for benefits had to be
considered, while evidence that could damage a claimant's application was
ignored or downplayed. Thus, the scale tipped ever so slightly in favor of
the claimant, but in a system adjudicating hundreds of thousands of claims,
even a slight tip translated, in the aggregate, into a huge expansion in the
disability rolls.
VI. CHILDHOOD DISABILITY
The most significant Social Security case is Sullivan v. Zebley,75 a
Supreme Court decision that struck down the SSA's procedures for
determining disability in children after having determined that they were
inadequate.7 6 The case vastly expanded eligibility for SSI's program for
disabled children and brought with it all types of political controversy and
administrative difficulty. The Social Security Act allows disabled children
to receive SSI payments if they have an impairment of "comparable
severity" to one that would prevent an adult from working. Because
children do not work, the SSA decided to limit its determination to its
catalog of medical impairments. Because individualized testing of function
and vocational characteristics was used to determine the work capacity of a
particular claimant, the SSA decided that it was not applicable to a child

71. O'Connor v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. Cunningham v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 911, 925 (D.C. App. 1985).
73. Purter,771 F.2d at 698 n.19.

74. Burton, 622 F. Supp. at 1147; Simmons v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 621 F.
Supp. 1174, 1176 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).

75. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). This was a 7-2 decision with Justice Blackmun writing the
opinion of the Court and Justices White and Rehnquist dissenting.
76. Id. at 522.
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who was not expected to engage in paid work activity. The children's
determination process, therefore, was a one-step process limited to a
determination of whether the child satisfied the medical criteria in the
agency's Listings.
By the late 1980s, Legal Services attorneys were well versed in the
minutiae of disability determination and they built upon their successes as
they pressed for the expansion of children's disability. In 1987,
Community Legal Services (CLS) of Philadelphia filed a class-action
lawsuit in the Third Circuit, alleging that the SSI children's program was
much more restrictive than the adult program because it did not provide an
individualized test of a child's functioning. CLS attorneys argued that
comparable results required a comparable process. The procedural
differences between the adult and children's program meant that the SSA
was not identifying children whose impairments were of "comparable
severity" to an impairment that would disable an adult. When the Third
Circuit sided with CLS, the SSA appealed to the Supreme Court. In 1990,
in Sullivan v. Zebley, the Supreme Court ruled that the SSA had erred in
not providing an individualized functional evaluation for children." While
a vocational assessment was clearly impossible since children did not work,
Justice Blackmun reasoned that the SSA could still assess function by
examining a child's ability to feed herself, dress herself, learn, and play-activities that Blackmun deemed the "work" of children.78 Shortly
thereafter, the SSA added an individualized functional assessment (IFA),
thus weighing for children, as for adults, the functional capacities of the
individual claimant.
Nevertheless, with Zebley the litigation strategy hit its limits. Unlike
the case of adult mental disability in the 1980s, Congress had not
sanctioned the liberalization of eligibility criteria for children. While some
lawmakers had considered passing legislation to create a functional test for
children in the late 1980s, liberals had failed to cobble together a majority
sufficient to back the proposal. 79 After Zebley, legal advocates did not need
congressional sanction; Zebley made the IFA a fait accompli. But, as will
be discussed below, Zebley, along with the numerous other class actions,
contributed to a "crisis" in the disability programs. By 1993, the

77. Id. at 540-41.
78. Id.

79. SSI Disabled and Blind Children Act of 1989, H.R. 868, 101st Cong. (1989);
Supplemental Security Income Reform Act of 1989, S. 665, 10 1st Cong. (1989) (amending
supplemental security income program to increase limits).
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exponential growth in DI and SSI expenditures (especially for children),

allegations from congressional watchdog agencies that the SSA was not
properly administering the disability programs, and media stories
describing children coached by their parents to "act crazy" in order to
secure benefits, became too much for lawmakers--especially the
Republicans who gained control of Congress--to stomach. In 1996,
Congress eliminated the IFA as part of its welfare reform initiative.
VII. OTHER DISABILITIES
Mental disability and childhood disability were not the only areas in
which legal advocates utilized their litigation strategy. Numerous boutique
law firms specializing in Social Security cases and organizations defending
disabled claimants, groups like the SSI Coalition for a Responsible Safety
Net and the National Organization of Social Security Claimants
Representatives (NOSSCR), sprang up around the country. Attorneys
published case material manuals and swapped legal strategies. They
established toll-free numbers through which claimants could seek legal aid
and share "horror stories."
Moreover, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the federal courts
issued rulings that touched every aspect of the DI and SSI programs. Legal
advocates brought a number of class action suits challenging the criteria
used to evaluate cardiovascular disease,80 AIDS and HIV,8 ' chronic
8
83
82
alcoholism and drug dependency, pain, diabetes, and hypertension. s
Attorneys also disputed routine administrative details, including the
methods for calculating the amount of SSI payments, 5 counting veteran's
benefits,8 6 determining whether the claimant's impairment has lasted for
twelve months or longer, 7 and the meaning of a "severe" impairment.88
By the end of 1992, the SSA confronted forty-six threatened or pending

80. New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990) (resulting in the reopening of
thousands of claims).
81. Rosetti v. Sullivan, 788 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
82. Schoolcraft v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992).
83. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990); Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161
(10th Cir. 1987); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984).

84. Hyatt, 899 F.2d at 329.
85. Farley v. Sullivan, 983 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1993).
86. White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1993).
87. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1993).
88. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). See also Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52
(3d Cir. 1989); Dixon v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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class action lawsuits dealing with issues related to its disability programs.8 9
Indeed, that year, the Congressional Research Service observed, "[t]he
Federal courts' influence is so extensive that SSA has difficulty contesting
the many decisions rendered against it."' s More than ever, by the late
1980s and early 1990s, policy change in Social Security disability was
driven by the courts rather than Congress.
VIII. THE TRADEOFFS OF LEGALISM

Despite the changes in disability determination that resulted from their
litigation campaign, advocates remained dissatisfied with the process. The
drive to reform Social Security disability through the courts spawned its
own problems. Gay Gellhorn writes:
Disability determination has to change. The process costs
too much and takes too long ....
Although the system
accomplishes its purpose of sustaining millions of very
poor, disabled people, it does so at costs that are
unacceptable to nearly everyone. From the claimants'
point of view, there is a crisis of confusion and delay.
They do not understand how to navigate the system
successfully, why it takes so long and why different levels
of the same agency reach opposite conclusions. 91
Gelhorn's sentiments were not confined to the advocacy community;
both within Congress and the SSA, policy makers, especially during the
1990s, expressed concern that the administration of the disability programs
was on the verge of collapse, and that major reforms were needed to bring
the programs under control. Although this is not entirely the fault of the
courts, the judicially driven nature of DI and SSI's expansion certainly
exacerbated the inherent weaknesses of disability determination and gave
rise to current concerns. The accumulating layers of court decisions and ad
hoc administrative responses to court decisions resulted in fragmented
disability standards, uncertain and confusing administration, an overall lack
of policy coherence, and unpredictable expenditures.
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IX. FRAGMENTATION OF POLICY

The American federal judicial system is highly fragmented. The
judges who sit on the nation's district courts and circuit courts set
precedent in their regions with relatively little oversight from the Supreme
Court.

Only the decisions of the Supreme Court apply nationwide;

otherwise, the legal precedent is binding only within the district or circuit
in which it is issued.
The balkanization of the federal court system is one of the
reasons that the SSA strongly resisted judicial intervention
into disability policy, and why it clung to nonacquiescence despite staunch public opposition to the
policy. According to the SSA, this fragmentation had the
potential to replicate itself in a fragmentation of policy, as
the courts became more insistent in articulating their own
alternative standards of disability. The SSA argued that
Congress had charged it with administering a nationally
uniform program and that it would be "abdicating its
responsibility if it turned over the determination of agency
policy to each of the 94 district courts or 12 circuit courts
that might render an opinion on the issue." 92 Trying to
tailor administrative practices to the controlling precedent
in each region would be difficult, confusing, and
inefficient. As the acting commissioner explained to
Congress: There would be enormous practical problems
with circuit-by-circuit acquiescence since we would need
to keep track of applicants as they move through the
decisionmaking process, determine which circuit law
should apply, and separately handle claims by jurisdiction.
Special problems could arise where there are conflicting
decisions within a single circuit, or a claimant or
beneficiary changes residence while a decision on appeal
is pending. 93

92. Social Security DisabilityInsurance: HearingBefore the House Subcommittee On
Social Security of the Committee On Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 37 (1983) (statement of
Paul B. Simmons, Deputy Commissioner for Programs and Policy, Social Security
Administration).
93. Social Security Disability InsuranceProgram:Hearing on S.476, HR. 4170 and
H.R. 3755 Before the Subcom.. on Finance, 98th Cong. 106 (1984) (statement of Hon.
Martha McSteen, Acting Comm'r, Social Security Administration).
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Judges, of course, were focused on individual justice, not
administrative convenience, but this left them free to ignore the extent to
which fragmentation was itself a disservice and an injustice to the
claimants they sought to protect.
Fragmentation, moreover, was not simply a matter of administrative
inconvenience; it contravened everything the SSA and the concept of
Social Security represented. For SSA officials, social insurance was an
improvement on public assistance precisely because it did not entail the
interstate variations in benefits levels and eligibility requirements that
characterized the state assistance programs. National uniformity, in other
words, was the distinguishing characteristic of Social Security, embodying
the respect and dignity that SSA officials believed beneficiaries should be
accorded.9 From the standpoint of equity, the SSA argued, it would be
confusing as well as unfair to claimants and beneficiaries "to subject claims
to different standards depending on where they reside. 9 5
Congress did not settle the issue of non-acquiescence when it enacted
the 1984 disability amendments. But under mounting pressure from the
courts, the SSA finally capitulated and adopted a policy of intra-circuit
acquiescence in late 1988. 9 As a result, the fragmentation of policy
standards intensified. Martha Derthick explained that from then on "there
were to be two disability determination processes-one bureaucratically
controlled and nationally uniform in application, the other judicially
controlled and potentially varying among the circuits." 97 In 1992,
surveying the state of the Social Security disability programs, investigators
at the Congressional Research Service reported to Congress, "[d]ifferent
standards are now in operation across
the country depending on the judicial
8
circuit in which someone lives.0

94. MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENcY UNDER STRESS 141-42 (1990). Even though it was a
means-tested program, these nationalizing goals had been folded into SSI when that
program was created in 1972.
95. Social Security DisabilityReviews: A Federally Created State Problem: Hearing
Before the House Comm. On Aging, 98th Cong. (1983) (statement of Paul B. Simmons,
Deputy Commissioner, Social Security).
96. Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits; Black Lung
Benefits; Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Organization
and Procedures; Application of Circuit Court Law, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,628 (Nov. 18, 1988) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 410, 416 & 422). Advocates disagree over whether the
SSA acquiesces in deed as well as word.
97 DERTHICK, supra note 95, at 149.
98 KOITZ, supranote 89, at 4-5.
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X. UNCERTAIN AND CONFUSING ADJUDICATION

Extensive judicial involvement in disability adjudication also
contributes to the present uncertainty and confusion in the disability
determination process. Judges enjoy a great deal of decisional autonomy.
While this frees them to make tough, unpopular choices, it can also prevent
them from providing clear and consistent guidance as to what practices
constitute proper standards for evaluating disability. While judges are
technically bound by precedent, they still do not speak with one voice. A
judge can always change her mind, and the decision in a particular case can
hinge on which judges happen to be sitting on the panel. It comes as no
surprise, therefore, that courts within the same circuit sometimes establish
internally conflicting standards.
For example, in the early 1980s, the Second Circuit was unable to
articulate a consistent rule regarding the evaluation of disability in which
pain was a factor. In 1980, it held that allegations of pain need not
"necessarily [be] supported by 'objective' clinical or laboratory findings" 99
and that "subjective pain may serve as the basis for establishing disability,
even if such pain is unaccompanied"'' 1 by clinical findings. Three years
later, however, it retreated from this position, ruling instead that "some
impairment [relating to the pain] must be medically ascertain[ed]."'' ° That
same year, the court changed course again, restating that pain could serve
as the basis for an award even if unsupported by objective medical
evidence. 0 2 In addition, in mental disability cases, judges have struck
down medical conclusions that administrative law judges (ALJs) have
drawn from the evidence, ruling that it is inappropriate for lay hearing
officers to play "amateur doctors."'' 0 3 Meanwhile, others have held that it is
perfectly acceptable for ALJs to draw reasonable conclusions regarding a

99. McLaughlin v. Sec'y of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 612 F.2d 701, 704 (2d Cir.
1980) (quoting Cuter v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1286-87 (2d Cir. 1975)).
100. Id. at 704 (quoting Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979)).
101. Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1983).
102. KUBITSCHEK, supra note 33, at 240-41 (discussing McLaughlin v. Sec'y of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, 612 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697
F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1983); Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Kuwahara v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also McAdams v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 726 F. Supp. 579 (D.N.J. 1989); Boiling v. Bowen, 682 F.
Supp. 864 (W.D. Va. 1988); Milonas v. Heckler, 626 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Mass. 1986).

2002]

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY

claimant's medical condition based on the evidence available. °4 What is a
disability examiner or ALJ to do given these contradictory signals?
Federal judges might not be overly troubled by intra-circuit conflict,
believing that it will eventually be sorted out. But in the interim, internal
conflict leads to confusion among state disability examiners and ALJs.
Since they do not know beforehand what the judge who might eventually
hear the case will think or expect they have no assurance that their
decisions will withstand judicial scrutiny. Thus, even if adjudicators
wanted to follow the dictates of overseeing judges, they still might not
know which judges to follow. Moreover, when courts are inconsistent,
claimants and their legal representatives are at a loss as how to prepare
their cases, and thus, may conclude that the process is arbitrary and unfair.
XI. LACK OF POLICY COHERENCE
In his influential book on the effect of courts on social policy, Donald
Horowitz argues that judges tend to tackle social problems in a discrete
fashion. By presenting only one aspect of a policy question that often
requires comprehensive solutions, litigation "isolate[s] artificially what in
the real world is merged."' 05 Because the remedies that courts provide fail
to take into account the complex connections between social problems,
they can result in incoherent policy at best, unforeseen and detrimental
results at worse.
This lack of coherence and its political consequences can be readily
seen in the controversy that engulfed the SSI program in the early 1990s.
The courts focused their rulings on the standards for a disability
determination: whether the SSA used the right standards or whether the
agency had gathered appropriate evidence when making decisions
regarding eligibility for payments. But for the SSA, adjudication of initial
disability claims was only one of the many responsibilities that accompany
the administration of DI and SSI. In the early 1990s, the agency was also
charged with conducting periodic reviews of the disability rolls, referring
disabled addicts to treatment programs, and referring younger disabled
claimants to vocational rehabilitation programs. Lawmakers saw these
obligations, not as separate from, but as an integral part of the Social
Security entitlement. Retaining these corresponding obligations, they

104. See Ray v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1988); Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763
(1 th Cir. 1987); Cameron v. Bowen, 683 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
105. HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 73.
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hoped temporarily disabled claimants would not look at the disability check
as a way of life, but rather as a stopgap measure that allowed the claimant
to rehabilitate.
The numerous court decisions handed down in the early 1990s,
however, severely compromised the SSA's ability to perform these
functions well or at all. They bombarded the SSA with additional
administrative tasks that taxed its capacity to do anything other than
process the claims that the courts foisted onto the agency. As part of the
settlement in Zebley, for instance, the district court overseeing the case
ordered the SSA to contact each of the approximately 450,000 children it
had denied between 1980 and 1990, and offer them the opportunity to redetermine eligibility. It also required the SSA to conduct a publicity
campaign informing disabled children and their parents of the liberalization
in program standards. The campaign was so successful that in 1994 alone,
SSA field offices received almost a half million applications from children.
Because of the retroactive and new claims arising from the publicity
campaign, the SSA faced a backlog of over 500,000 children's claims to be
adjudicated that year. This represented four times the children's caseload
the SSA was accustomed to handling in a typical year. Several other courts
during the same time period ordered the SSA to re-open and re-adjudicate
the claims of tens of thousands of class members, some with claims
stretching as far back as a decade. 10
At the same time that the courts and a downturn in the economy
produced an increase in initial and retroactive claims to be processed, the
SSA was massively downsizing, leaving it ill-prepared to handle the surge
in applications. 0 7 Administrative capacity was not, however, a factor that
courts considered when they handed down their decisions. Indeed, many
legal scholars argue that it should not be.'08 Failure to consider capacity,
nevertheless, can wreak havoc on program administration and policy
outcomes. For instance, congressional investigators estimated that in 1993,
the SSA confronted a backlog of well over one million disability claims.

106. See, e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990); Stieberger v.
Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
107. Staff at state disability determination agencies has remained fairly constant, but
applications have increased from about 1.2 million to close to 2 million between fiscal years
1988 and 1993. See generally Notices: Process Reengineering Program; Disability
Reengineering Project Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47887, 47891, 47893-94 (Sept. 19, 1994).
108. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in a Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L.
REv. 659, 659-70 (1997).
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This was an unprecedented situation. It represented four times the number
of backlogged cases the SSA carried during the workload crisis of the mid1970s when the agency struggled to implement SSI.' 9 Because of these
workload pressures, the SSA diverted its resources away from its periodic
reviews. The same staff that processed initial applications also processed
the reviews, and the SSA simply did not have the resources to do both
simultaneously. Other important responsibilities-the referral of applicants
to vocational rehabilitation and of addicts to treatment progrmns--never
high priorities of the agency in the first place, fell by the wayside." 0
The workload crisis was not only the result of the courts--Congress
contributed by repeatedly cutting the SSA's administrative budget
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the courts--by rendering
their decisions absent consideration of what other courts were doing, of the
economic context in which they operated, and of the complexities of
disability adjudication-reemained blithely inattentive to practical
administrative constraints. While insulation from the rough and tumble of
politics can be a virtue of the courts, it can also become a liability when
judges are insensitive to the ways in which their decisions can dictate
agency priorities and, in turn, affected program politics. In the case of SSI,
rushed processing of applications and neglect of the periodic reviews
helped fuel media allegations of fraud and abuse, of parents coaching their
children to "act crazy" to win awards, and of addicts shirking requirements
that they attend treatment programs."' The allegations of fraud and abuse
abetted conservative attempts to retrench SSI, and in 1996, Congress
restricted eligibility for disabled children and addicts. Moreover, this
disjointed approach to disability-in which awards were divorced from
corresponding obligations, treatment, rehabilitation, and review (functions
that ensured program integrity and responsible behavior on the part of
recipients)--was not what lawmakers envisioned for the Social Security
disability programs. It is also likely not what judges would have wanted
had they stopped to ponder disability holistically.

109. Korz, supra note 89, at 17-18, 60.
110. See SOCIAL SECURrrY ADvISORY BOARD, 2000 SSI ANNUAL REPORT (2000)
(detailing the problems within the SSA), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/SSIR/

SSI00/ssiV..A.html.

11. See generally U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., GAO/HEHS-95-66, NEw FUNCTIONAL
ASSESSMENTS FOR CmLDREN RAISE ELIGILITY QUESTONS (1995); U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF.,
GAO/HEHS-94-128, MAJOR CHANGES NEEDED FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR ADDICTS
(1994).
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XII. UNPREDICTABLE EXPENDITURES

A final drawback to the court-inspired transformation of Social
Security disability was its isolation from the very officials who would have
to allocate money to pay for that expansion. Because DI and SSI are
entitlements, any person whom the SSA found to have met the disability
criteria was "entitled" to benefit payments. Throughout the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the courts added more and more claimants to the category of
persons entitled to benefits, sometimes little by little as in the case of
individual lawsuits. On other occasions, hundreds, if not thousands, were
added at one time through class action challenges. By one estimate, the
case of Sullivan v. Zebley alone approximately
led to the enrollment of
2
130,000 disabled children in SSI."
Unpredictable judicial action made forecasting program expenditures a
frustrating exercise. Spending for both DI and SSI increased unexpectedly
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1985, the SSA paid out nineteen
billion dollars for DI benefits and seven billion dollars for SSI payments.
By 1994, expenditures for disability benefits had reached thirty-eight
billion dollars for DI and nineteen billion dollars for SSI. In real dollars,
this represented an increase in spending of 59% over ten years for both
programs. Considered separately, after controlling for inflation, spending
for DI increased by 45% while spending for SSI doubled. When the costs
of Medicare and Medicaid (for which DI and SSI beneficiaries,
respectively, are eligible) were added, spending for the disabled during the
ten year period from 1985 through 1994 had doubled to well over 107
billion dollars." 3 Neither the policy makers at the SSA nor lawmakers in
Congress had foreseen these developments.
Caught by surprise, lawmakers were greatly troubled by the surge in
disability spending. 1 4 By 1992, the rapid growth in the disability programs

112. This number is from March 1, 1994, during which time, the SSA had readjudicated 287,900 of the 321,600 children who were members of the Zebley class. It had
33,700 cases left to re-adjudicate. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO/HEHS-94-225, RAPID RISE
INCHILDREN ON SSI DISABILrrY ROLLS FOLLOWS NEW REGULATIONS 8 (1994).
113. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO/T-HEHS-95-97, FEDERAL DISABILITY PROGRAMS
FACE MAJOR ISSUES 95, 97 (1995).
114. The expansion in spending that took place after the passage of the 1984
amendments to reform the periodic review process was not unexpected. Although the
growth in spending that took place as a result of the revision of the mental disorders listings

was difficult to predict-end in fact Congress did not attempt to project costs of this
measure-it had provided cost estimates for the other statutory changes.
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finally pushed DI and SSI reform onto the congressional agenda. In April
of that year, actuarial projections predicted the trust fund for DI could
become insolvent in three years if lawmakers took no corrective action.
The event focused lawmakers' attention on DI and, by extension, SSI.
Though the funding crisis in DI was resolved by reallocating money from
the retirement insurance trust fund to the disability trust fund, policy
makers and members of Congress continued to voice concern centering on
the long-term implications of the expansion in the Social Security disability
programs.' 5 Indeed, Senator William Cohen, a strong supporter of the
disability programs throughout the 1980s, argued that the pace of
expansion was both unsustainable and inequitable. "At the same time we
have been assuring senior citizens that we will leave Social Security
alone," he explained, "a very real threat has been silently creeping up on
the solvency of the Social Security trust funds--namely, the unfettered
growth of the Social Security Disability Insurance program." 6 The
proposals to restrict disability benefits for substance abusers, legal
immigrants, and children, that eventually were enacted as part of the
Contract with America and welfare reform, gained political momentum as
lawmakers considered various ways of reining in the Social Security
disability programs.
CONCLUSION

In the hands of mental health reformers and children's advocates,
litigation became a tool for leveraging progressive change in the Social
Security disability programs. Because of their efforts, DI and SSI became
much more liberalized programs, especially for the mentally ill and poor
disabled children--two groups of the disabled that in the past generally
lacked a strong political presence on Capitol Hill. Not only did advocates
manage to expand the disability standards for DI and SSI, but by pushing
for an increased emphasis on individual functional capacity, they have also
opened the door to individuals who were previously excluded from Social
Security through the SSA's restrictive interpretations of mental and
childhood disability. Without question, because of the litigation efforts of

115. Stanford Ross, The Perspective of a Public Trustee, in GROwrH IN DISABILrrY
BENEFTS: EXPLANATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 319-24 (W.E. Upjohn ed., 1998).
116. Problems in the Social Security DisabilityPrograms: The Disablingof America:
Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Cohen, Member, Special Comm. on Aging).
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advocates, the Social Security disability certification process is more
exacting and more thorough today than in 1980. Moreover, thousands
more disabled children and adults are provided a measure of income
security through the two disability benefit programs.
These positive developments, however, have not come without costs as
well. Because the political debate over program expansion occurred within
the courtroom rather than Congress, issues of costs and the corresponding
balance of the entitlement with certain behavioral requirements (like
treatment for addicts) were not considered. This is not to say that Congress
would necessarily have considered these larger systemic issues, but they
are much more likely to be addressed in the legislature than in the courts,
which tend to focus narrowly on individualized justice. Moreover, the
courts were unable to articulate coherent criteria for determining disability,
leaving disability standards fragmented from one circuit to the next, and
from one judge to the next within the same circuit.
Despite all of the tradeoffs associated with legalism, the question is not
so much: "How do we undo all the bad things that the courts have done?"
In fact, the courts have done many good things as well, for they have
improved the disability determination process by making it more rigorous
(albeit in part because they do not become bogged down in disagreement
over how to pay for these more exacting procedures). They have opened
the disability benefit programs to vulnerable individuals who cannot lobby
on their own behalf because they lack the political clout, not to mentionbecause of their disabilities-the cognitive or emotional wherewithal to
succeed in such activities. Those improvements came part and parcel with
judicial activism in Social Security disability policy. The real challenge of
reforming the disability benefit programs, therefore, is how to create a
disability determination system that is timely, easy to use, consistent, and
uniform without sacrificing the protections for the mentally disabled and
disabled children that were put in place and are enforced today by the
federal courts. It is a tall order indeed.

